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Learning from the Limits of an
Adjudicatory Strategy for Resolving
United States-Canada Fisheries
Conflicts: Lessons from the Gulf of
Maine
ABSTRACT
Growing concern about the world's fisheries and the capacity of
internationalinstitutions to sustain them led us to reexamine the
use of a World Court Chamber to resolve a boundary conflict
between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine.
Among that case'suniquefeatureswas an unprecedentedargument,
mounted by the United States, that turnedfisheries conservation
and management into a legal principlefor boundary delimitation.
We raise the question of whether the World Court is an appropriate
institutionfor addressingproblems of managing and conserving
fisheries. To test its appropriateness,we examine the rhetorical
practicesassociatedwith that institutionas manifested in the Gulf
of Maine case. Those practices include (1) framing the natural
resource problem primarily as a political problem, (2) use of
strategicallydesigned,linearargumentson behalfofpre-established
claims thatconceal system icfeaturesofthefisheriesproblem, (3) use
of evaluative standardsbased on politics and equity but without
regard to ecological concerns, and (4) selective use of science to
supportpredeterminedclaims ratherthan selectingclaims based on
an understanding of the problem's ecological dimensions. These
practices indicate that the fisheries conflict did not belong in the
adjudicatoryprocess,especially since an importantalternativewas
then andis still available.Wearguethat institutionalarrangements
modeled after the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries and the
GreatLakes Fishery Commission have greatercapacity to induce
rhetorical practices more conducive to addressing the fisheries
problems in the Gulf of Maine.

Lawrence J.Prelli is Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the
University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire. Mimi Larsen-Becker is Associate
Professor in the Department of Natural Resources at the University of New Hampshire,
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INTRODUCTION
There is growing concern about the state of the world's fisheries
and the apparent failure of current institutional arrangements to manage
them sustainably.' The purpose of this study is to examine the Chamber
procedure of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an institutional
context for addressing conflicts over natural resource problems such as
sustaining shared fisheries. Our case concerns the 1984 ICJ Chamber
decision imposing a maritime boundary between the United States and
Canada in the Gulf of Maine area.2 We found that the Chamber procedure
creates an institutional environment that fosters rhetorical practices
designed to further political objectives rather than mitigate natural resource
problems. We suggest that alternative institutional arrangements modeled
after the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (CGLF) and the Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission (GLFC) will enable rhetorical practices more capable
of addressing the fisheries crisis in the Gulf of Maine today.4
We chose the 1984 Gulf of Maine case for several reasons: (1) the
case involved jurisdiction over Georges Bank, then site of one of the world's
richest-but increasingly overfished-fisheries, (2) the United States
defended its claim for control over Georges Bank with an unprecedented

1. Forextendeddiscussionof thoseconcensforspecificfisheriesdistributed worldwide,
including the Northwest Atlantic, see CARL SAFINA, SONG FOR THE BLUE OCEAN (1997); COUN
WOODARD, OCEANS END: TRAVELS THROUGH ENDANGERED SEAS (2000); and PaR WEBER, NET

LOSS: FISH, JOBS, AND THE MARINE ENVIRONuENT (1994). For more focused treatments of
problems in Northwest Atlantic fisheries see MICHAEL HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN (1998);
CHARLES H. COLLNS, BEYOND DENIAL THE NORTHEASTERN FoisEECRL (1994); and DAVID
DOBBS, THE GREAT GULF (2000).
2. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984
IC.J. 246 (Oct. 12) [hereinafter Gulfofftaej.
3. Our use of the term "rhetoric" is not intended to evoke pejorative associations, but to
denote the persuasive dimension of communication. Accordingly, "rhetorical practices" are
communicative practices designed for persuasive influence with particular audiences. We
focus on how rhetorical practices enabled by adjudicatory institutions such as the Chamber
procedure of the World Court impedeecologically centered analysis of and response to natural
resource problems. That focus then allows consideration of alternative institutions that could
yield strategies more conducive to addressing problems from an ecological perspective. For
an introduction to leading features of rhetoric's conceptual meaning see LAwREN E J.P11w,
ARHETORICOFSCIENCE: INVENTINGSC
CDIScouRS 11-32 (1989). For a related discussion
of the rhetorical aspects of policy-making institutions, see GANDomico MAONz EvIDENCE,
ARGUMENT, AND PERSUASION INTHE POLCY PRCESS (1989).
4. For a useful analysis of institutional preconditions that are likely to enable rhetorical
practices conducive to resolving natural resource problems, see David G. LeMarquand,
Preconditionsto Cooperationin Canada-UnitedStates Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCMsJ. 221
(1986). For a related institutional critique of the ICJ and its Chambers as a potential vehicle for
resolving environmental conflicts, see Jeffrey L Dunoff, InstitutionalMisfits: The GATT, the IC,
and Trade-Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J.INI'L L 1043,1085-1108 (1994).
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argument that attempted to turn ecologically informed fisheries
conservation and management into a legal principle for boundary
delimitation, (3) the United States assumed that the Chamber procedure
furnished a suitable forum for making that argument, (4) the win-lose legal
remedy to the conflict departed from a history of United States-Canada
cooperation in management of shared natural resources, and (5) the
ongoing decline of commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Maine today
underscores the importance and timeliness of revisiting this pivotal event
in a search for workable policy responses.
The dispute between the United States and Canada began after the
two countries declared 200-mile exclusive fisheries zones from their
respective coastlines,5 excluding foreign fishing vessels and opening
prospects for their own fishermen to fill the gap and reap large economic
gains.' In the Gulf of Maine, U.S. and Canadian fishermen suddenly became
foreigners to each other due to overlapping jurisdictional claims that left
17,650 square nautical miles in dispute, including 5,450 over Georges Bank.7
The two countries agreed to settle the dispute by using an ad hoc Chamber
of the World Court 8 The Chamber procedure afforded them the advantage
of influencing the tribunal's composition and number of judges rather than
putting the case before the entire 15-member court.' Moreover, the Special
Agreement between the two parties that conferred jurisdiction on the
Chamber constrained its latitude for decision in two ways. One is that the
two parties framed the question that the Chamber had to decide: where to
locate a single maritime boundary for division of both seabed and fisheries

5. By this time, there was an international movement developing in support of the 200mile Exclusive Economic Zone, which ultimately drew Increased authority as a customary
prindple of international law from the 1982 Third International Conference on the Law of the

Sea (LOS). See Sang-Myon Rhee, EquitableSolutions to the MaritimeBoundary Disputebetween the
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM. J. INIr'L. L 590, 592-93 (1981); Mark B.
Feldman &David Colson, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, 75 AM. J. bIN'L L 729,

754-56(1981).
6. William E.Shrank, ExtendedFisheriesJurisdiction:Originsof the CurrentCrisisin Atlantic
Canada'sFisheries,19 MARINE POL'Y 285,285-86,290-91 (1995); Lenox O'Reilly Hinds, Crisis in

Canada'sAtlantic Sea Fisheries, 19 MARINE POL'Y 271,276 (1995); DOBS, supranote 1, at 103-05.
7. Davis R.Robinson et aL, Some Perspectiveson Adjudicating before the World Court: The
Gulfof Maine Case, 79 AM. J.I L L. 578,579 n.5 (1985).
8. Article 26 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice allows parties to turn to
an ad hoc tribunal for resolution of disputes. In 1972, the Court amended its rules and
procedures to facilitate recourse to Chambers of the Court. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, The

Amendments to the Rules of Procedureof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 67 AM. J.INT'L. L. 1,

(1973).
9. The first ICJ Chamber was composed of five judges elected by the full court after
consultationwith the two parties: Judge Roberto Ago (Italy), who served as its president;Judge
Andre Gros (France); Judge Hermann Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany); Judge Stephen
Schwebel (US.); and Judge ad hoc Maxwell Cohen (Canada).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

resources in the disputed area. The other is that the parties specified
coordinates both for the boundary's starting point and for an area within
which the World Court had to locate the boundary's ending point."
The Gulf of Maine case was unprecedented in international law in
three ways." First, the United States and Canada were the first nations to
make use of the Chamber procedure. Second, the case marked the first
international arbitration of overlapping 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones.
Thus, the Chamber was the first legal panel asked to impose a single line
that determined jurisdiction over both continental shelf and fisheries
resources. Third, the Chamber was called upon to actually draw the
boundary rather than articulate principles for the two parties to follow
when making the division themselves.
The Gulf of Maine case illustrates how the decision to choose the
Chamber institution fostered rhetorical practices that worked to resolve the
political conflict between the United States and Canada while obscuring the
underlyingnatural resource problem that spurred the fisheries conflict. The
two parties' decision to take the conflict to court was the logical
consequence of their efforts to address the problem of overfishing by
excluding competitors rather than bringing overall fishing capacity into line
with the declining resource base-efforts exemplified by the 200-mile
exclusive fisheries zones."2 Meanwhile, there were signs that ecological
patterns were being disrupted over Georges Bank. Between 1963 and 1983

10. Special Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States of America to Submit to a Chamber of the International Court of Justice the
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, LC.J. Pleadings (1
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area) 10-12 (Mar. 29,1979).

11. See Jan Schneider, The Gulfof Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM.J.
IT'L L. 539,541-42 (1985). SeealsoPaul D.McHugh, InternationalLaw-Delimitationof Maritime
Boundaries, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1025,1025-26 (1985).

12. There seemed to be ambivalence on the part of both federal governments regarding
the need to restore the declining resource base rather than take measures to maintain
employment levels through economic development of the fisheries. Passage of the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, P.L 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 [hereinafter,
MFCMA, which established a fisheries management regime as well as the 200-mile exclusive
fisheries zones, was advocated both to exclude foreign competitors based on the need to

restore and conserve the resource base and to strengthen the faltering American fisheries
industry. Similarly, the Canadian exclusive fishing zone was enacted for reasons of both
conservation and economics. However, subsequent actions of both governments seemed to tilt
the balance away from conservation and toward economic considerations. For an example of
the dual reasons offered on behalf of the MFCMA, see Two-Hundred-MileFishingZone: Hearing

on S. 961 before the Subcommittee on Oceans and InternationalEnvironment of the Committee an
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 75-77 (1975) (statement of Senator Warren G. Magnuson). For a
discussion of the American situation, see SAFINA, supranote 1, at 43-44, and DOBBS, supranote
1,at 57-58,103-05. For a full discussion of the Canadian situation, see Schrank, supranote 6, at
285-96. See also WOODWARD, supranote 1,at 77-79, and HARRIS, supranote 1, at 78-97.
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groundfish declined from 70 percent to 15 percent of total population while
fish of low commercial value (skates and dogfish) increased from 22 percent
to 74 percent. 3 Nor did problems of overfishing abate after the ICJdecision,
as both countries enacted closures and other restrictions to keep important
fish stocks at Georges Bank from the brink of collapse.1 '
Identifying relevant institutional arrangements that can address
fisheries sustainability is much more than an academic exercise. We contend
that one way to test the presence or absence of such institutions is to
examine the standard rhetorical practices they foster.' Specifically, the Gulf
of Maine case illustrates four rhetorical practices that together indicate that
the Chamber institution is not designed to ameliorate natural resource
problems." In the following discussion, we identify those "negative"
indicators, or signs of institutional failure, with the ultimate aim of using
them as a basis for reflection about institutional arrangements that could
enable rhetorical practices more conducive to addressing sustainable
fisheries problems. We first discuss the strategy of framing a natural
resource problem primarily as a political problem whose resolution requires
an effort to "win" an entire pre-established position. Second,we show that
the practice of designing linear and reductive arguments on behalf of preestablished claims conceals systemic and integrative features of the natural
resource problem. Third, we examine the practice of adjudicating disputes
through some form of compromise thatbalances equities, political interests,

13. Allen L Springer, Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? The Gulf of MaineRevisited, 6
IWrL ENVTL. AFFAMs 223, 232-33 (1994). See also DOBS, supranote 1, at 71-78. As this article
is being written, even the relatively new dogfish fishery is evidently showing signs of
impending collapse due to overfishing, demonstrating how spedes-by-species management
of the Gulf's fisheries continues to obscure ecological relationships whose maintenance is
required to sustain those fisheries. See Alexander Reid, WorriesVoiced on Do&fsh Limits, Boston
Globe, Apr. 7,2000, at B4.
14. Glen J. Herbert, Fisheries Relations in the Gulf of Maine: Implications of an Arbitrated
Boundary,19 MARINEPOL'Y 301,315-16 (1995); DOBBS, supranote 1,at 58-59; Shrank, supranote
6, at 285-86:
15. We do not examine comprehensively the Canadian and the U.S. legal cases. For
general overviews and technical analyses of those cases see the following articles authored by
lawyers who participated in the Gulf case L.H. Legault &Blair Hankey, From Sea to Seabed: The
Single Maritime Boundaryin the Gulf ofMaine Case 79 AM.J. WI'L. L 961 (1985); Robinson et al.,
supra note 7, at 578-97; Schneider, supra note 11, at 539-77. For a discussion of maritime
boundary law, see David Colson, The Legal Regime of Maritime Boundary Agreements, in I
WInNA7IONALMARmilMEBOUNDARIBS41 (Jonathan l.Chamey & L M. Alexander eds., 1993).
16. Our analysis is based on extensive review of legal documents as well as focused
interviews of leading participants in the case. For the interview instrument and associated
protocols see Lawrence J.Prelli, The Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Dispute: A Case Study
of Constraints on Deliberations about Natural Resource Problems before a Chamber of the
World Court (1998) (unpublished M.S. project, University of New Hampshire) (on file with the
Univ. of N. M. School of Law Library).
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and the law without regard to ecological concerns. Fourth, we discuss the
practice of using science selectively in view of predetermined claims rather
than selecting those claims based on an understanding of the problem's
ecological dimensions. Finally, we argue that alternative institutional
arrangements for addressing the fisheries crisis can be modeled after the
Convention on the Great Lakes Fisheries and the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission.
I. THE POLITICAL FRAMING OF A NATURAL RESOURCE
PROBLEM
When the United States decided to shift its conflict with Canada to
the World Court for binding arbitration, it enacted a strategy designed to
resolve a political problem. That strategy effectively put an end to a
seemingly intractable conflict while insulating President Reagan's
administration from possible negative consequences should the World
Court's decision prove politically unpopular. However, the strategy
inadvertently deflected attention from the perceived natural resource
problem that commercial fisheries could not be sustained at desired levels.
Consequently, the strategy continued attempts to maintain those levels by
excluding competitors from the fishery rather than grappling with the
ecological dimensions of the overfishing problem. The political-rather
than ecological-understanding of the problem is well illustrated by the
failure of the East Coast Fisheries Agreement (ECFA), the comprehensive
agreement between the United States and Canada that would have defined7
joint management and allocation arrangements for the east coast fisheries.1
A. The Political Strategy as a Response to the ECFA Failure
The political importance of the conflict was underscored in mid1977 when special negotiators were appointed to work out difficult fisheries
and boundary issues." On March 29,1979, the ECFA was concluded." The
ECFA established a management regime for 28 commercial fish stocks in
the Gulf of Maine area." A proposed joint fisheries commission would
determine overall annual catches for transboundary and other stocks the

17. Agreement on East Coast Fishery Resources, Mar. 29,1979, U.S.-Can., S. Exec. Doc.

V,96-1 (1980).
18. Lloyd Cutler represented the United States, and Marcel Cadieux represented Canada.

Robinson et aL, supra note 7, at 579.
19. For a discussion of this agreement in the context of evolving policy related to the Gulf
fisheries, see Herbert, supra note 14, at 307.08; Ted L McDorman et al., The Gulf of Maine
Boundary. DroppingAnchor or Setting a Course? 2 MARuNE POL'Y 90,91 (1985).
20. Herbert, supra note 14, at 307.

Spring 20011

LESSONS FROM THE GULF OF MAINE

two parties agreed should be managed as a unit." That commission would
allocate quotas that were subject to review every ten years and possible
adjustment given changes in fishing patterns.' The ECFA was linked with
a second treaty, a binding maritime dispute settlement agreement, in which
the two parties agreed to have the ICJ decide the maritime boundary in the
Gulf of Maine. 3 The ECFA yielded the advantage of minimizing disruption
to ongoing fishing activities in the area that otherwise would occur if
fisheries jurisdiction was decided through third party imposition of the
maritime boundary line.'
The New England congressional delegation and fishing industry
leaders formed opposition to the ECFA. Congressional opposition was
mounted by a bipartisan bloc of New England Senators, including Ted
Kennedy from Massachusetts, Claibom Pell from Rhode Island, and Lowell
Weicker, Jr., from Connecticut. 25 Testimony from fishing industry leaders
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations emphasized that the
agreement locked in unfair allocations restricting U.S. fishers both from
initiating new fisheries and from increasing their participation in ongoing,
established fisheries-particularly the lucrative scallop fishery at the
northeastern peak of Georges Bank. 6 Spokesmen for the American Fisheries
Defense Committee-a lobby devoted exclusively to opposing the
ECFA-even scolded United States ECFA negotiators for, in effect, failing
to secure Georges Bank as an American bank. 7 Mr. Leigh S. Ratiner went
so far as to define the "appropriate" U.S. bargaining stance:
The U.S. believes that it owns the resources on all of Georges
Bank, and therefore any discussion of what we gave up in this
fisheries treaty has got to be in the context of what we believe

21. Id.at 308.
22. Id.
23. S. Exec. Doc. No. U, 96-1.
24. McDorman et al., supranote 19, at 91; Herbert, supra note 14, at 308.
25. Robinson et al., supra note 7, at 580; McDorman et al., supra note 19, at 91-92. See
Maritime Boundary Settlement Treatyand East Coast FisheryResources Agreement: Hearingson Ex.
Q, 96-1 and Ex. V. 96-1 before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations,96th Cong. 103-104 (1980)
[hereinafter Maritime Hearings)(prepared statement of Senator Edward Kennedy); id. at 1-2
(statement of Senator Claibomr Pell); id. at 74-76 (statement of Senator Lowell Weicker, Jr.). See
also id. at 3-6 (opposing remarks of Senator William Cohen); id. at 7-9 (opposing remarks of
Senator John Chafee).
26. For examples, see Maritime Hearings,supranote 25, at 150-55 (statements of Kenneth
Daniels, Daniels Enterprises; Arthur Fass, Fass Brothers, Inc.; Jeff Reichle, Vice President,
Lund's Fisheries, Inc.). See also Herbert, supranote 14, at 308.
27. See MaritimeHearings,supranote 25, at 49-53 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, American
Fisheries Defense Committee); id. at 118-20 (statement of Jacob I. Dykstra, president, Point
Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association, Inc., and Chairman of the American Fisheries
Defense Committee).
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our rights to be. We believe our rights to be ownership of all
the fish on Georges Bank. Accordingly, it seems to me, that
there would be a very heavy burden on the administration to
justify even a slight diminution in fishing rights which would
otherwise be exercised by Americans.'
Despite Secretary of State Edmund Muskie's efforts to save the
agreement during the waning months of the Carter Administration, the
ECFA never secured political support sufficient to make it out of committee
for a ratification vote on the Senate floor 2 ' The Canadians were so
frustrated by this turn of events that the Canadian Minister for External
Affairs called it the worst bilateral problem Canada had with any other
country.'*
By the spring of 1981, President Ronald Reagan had been
inaugurated and his transition team was at work on the fisheries conflict in
anticipation of his first visit to Canada.' By then, the ECFA had languished
in committee for nearly two years. Mr. David Colson, who was then legal
counsel to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Rozanne Ridgway,
recalled his role in formulating the strategy to put the fisheries conflict
before the court.32 According to Mr. Colson, some State Department officials
thought President Reagan should discuss the failed fisheries agreement
while in Ottawa, but given the high level of political acrimony surrounding
the issue, Secretary of State Alexander Haig opposed that idea.3 Mr. Colson
advised that the State Department should turn to the World Court to settle
the fisheries dispute along with the maritime boundary.' The new
Administration agreed. The President could then have a good visit with this
difficult political obstacle safely out of the way.3
On March 6, 1981, on the eve of his visit to Canada, President
Reagan withdrew the ECFA from the Senate and proposed its uncoupling
from the boundary treaty, which, after some technical revisions, could then

28. See MaritimeHearings, supranote 25, at 50 (statement of Leigh S. Ratiner, American
Fisheries Defense Committee).
29. For full analysis of reasons for the failure of the ECFA see DAVID L VANDERZWAAG,
THE FisH FEUD: THE U.S. AND CANADIAN BouNDARY DtS.uis 90-91 (1983); and Sang-Myon
Rhee, The Application ofEquitable Principlesto Resolve the United States-CanadaDisputeover East
Coast Fishery Resources, 21 HARV. INT'L LJ. 667,673-80 (1980).
30. Robinson et aL, supra note 7, at 580.
31. Interview with David A. Colson, Deputy Agent and Counsel for the United States in
the Gulf of Maine Case, in Wash., D.C. (July 29,1997).
32. Mr. Colson later became the chief architect of the U.S. legal case on the Gulf of Maine
boundary dispute.
33. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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be submitted for Senate ratification.' The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee agreed to frame a resolution in favor of that approach, which
was adopted by the Senate on April 29, 1981.' Canada was left to decide
whether to agree with this revised agreement. On November 20, 1981,
Canada reluctantly signed the amended treaty. '
The decision to take the fisheries issue to the World Court enacted
a political strategy designed to end the conflict with Canada. Generally, this
strategy uses legal arbitration to resolve boundary disputes in
circumstances where political leaders lack the will or authority to resolve
the conflict through compromise. If the World Court renders a compromise
decision-as is likely-politicians could dodge blame for not winning an
entire claim while attaining the compromise needed to terminate the
conflict. According to Mr. Colson, U.S. advisors believed that the strategy
fit the circumstances of the Gulf of Maine situation." One reason was that
the fishing community would generally support the decision to take the
case to court and try to win the entire claim. Ridgway and Colson had a
good relationship with the fishing industry (she was Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State and Ambassador-at-Large for Oceans and Fisheries from
1975 to 19 7 7 ),' so strategists were confident that they could secure their
support for a legal "roll of the dice." 1 The Administration thereby gained
protection should the World Court's ultimate judgment prove unpopular
among U.S. fishing interests.42 Mr. Davis Robinson, appointed by the
Secretary of State to serve as United States Agent in the Gulf of Maine case,
adduced another reason: the World Court is an especially good venue for
arbitration since its prestige would help give the decision "a patina of
respectability and acceptability."0 He elaborated on the merits of the
overall strategy:
The politicians decided. ..we'll simply send it to the lawyers.
And there were not bad reasons for doing so. Fishermen from
both countries accepted that result. Both countries had an
Anglo-American legal tradition. And the politicians wanted

36. For discussion of procedural maneuvers involved in revision of the treaty see Rhee,
supra note 5, at 597-98. See also Robinson et aL, supranote 7, at 580. The amended treaty can be
found at T.I.A.S. No. 10,204, at 2802.
37. Rhee, supra note 5, at 598.
38. Id.; Herbert, supra note 14, at 308; Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31.
39. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
40. See WHO'SWHOiNThE WORLD 1978-1979, at 782 (Marquis Who's Who, Inc. ed., 4th ed.

1979).
41. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
42. Id.
43. Interview with Davis Robinson, Agent and Counsel for the United States in the Gulf

of Maine Case, inWashington, D.C. (July 29,1997).
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to get rid of it; they could blame the lawyers and judges if the
decision was unpopular."
Americans interviewed for this study acknowledged that the
political strategy was simply aimed at making the fisheries conflict "go
away."' Implementing that strategy entailed developing a politically
acceptable and rhetorically plausible legal case excluding Canadian
fishermen from Georges Bank. Thus, both Americans and Canadians
continued the pattern prevalent for mitigating fisheries conflicts in the Gulf
area: maintaining levels of yield for one's own nationals-at least over the
short term-by excluding competitors. The problem of bringing overall
fishing capacity into alignment with levels the resources could sustain over
the longer term was not perceived as the issue.
B. Rhetorical Adaptation of the Political Strategy
The task of implementing the political strategy created a special
rhetoricalproblem: the United States had to develop a legal case adjusted to
the distinctive and potentially incompatible expectations of political and
legal audiences. On the one hand, American domestic political
constituencies and their congressional representatives expected no less than
legal sanction of U.S. "rights" to all of Georges Bank. On the other, a legal
tribunal attempting to render an equitable decision within the bounds of
international law is not expected to give one of two parties locked in
political conflict its entire claim to a disputed area. Convincing the Court
that such an outcome is both legally justifiable and equitable is a difficult
persuasive obstacle to meet. That special rhetorical problem-a problem of
persuasion-accounts for the bold case the United States ultimately put
before the World Court. Two initial challenges confronting the United
States were the need to adjust its case to evolving international law while
also maintaining arguments that would resonate with domestic political
audiences.
United States strategists considered three previous decisions on
continental shelf issues as they prepared the Gulf case: the North Sea
ContinentalShelf Cases (1969), the Anglo-French ContinentalShelf Case (1977),
and the Libya-TunisiaContinentalShelf Case (1981)." They found that the law

44. Id.
45. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
46. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 ( Feb. 20);
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the French Republic, 18 LLNM 397 (1979); Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J.
18 (Feb. 24). See also Feldman
& Colson, supra note 5, at 754-58; Robinson et al.,
supranote 7, at 586.
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indicated that any proposed boundary must be warranted according to
"equitable principles" in view of special circumstances in the particular
case.47 However, the Tunisia-LibyaContinentalShelf decision had important
implications for the U.S. position, spurring a last minute revision of its
boundary claim before filing its Memorial with the court.4
The United States previously had depicted Georges Bank as part of
the natural prolongation of its continental shelf ending at the Northeast
Channel, portraying that feature as geologically sufficient to differentiate
two shelves.49 Accordingly, the United States initially argued for a
boundary that followed the "line of deepest water" from the international
land boundary terminus at the coast through the Northeast Channel and
out toward the continental slope.' In Tunisia-Libya, the court rejected the
parties' geological arguments as insufficient legal bases for shelf
delimitation-including the geological sense of "natural prolongation"and emphasized instead geographical factors. s That stance alone furnished
a legal basis for the United States to change its boundary position.Y In

addition, the apparent weakness of the Northeast Channel argument was
compounded when expert advisors for the United States reported that they
could not state as fact the claim that it was a major sea floor feature in the
continental shelf and "keep a straight face."' Of course, by then political
interest in the dispute had shifted from oil and gas prospects to the
commercial fisheries.O For legal, scientific, and political reasons the United
States needed an alternative strategy for presenting its case.

47. For a discussion of law relevant to the case see McHugh, supranote 11, at 1028-38.
48. Major legaldocuments filed with the ICJ are called Memorials,Counter-Memorials,and
Replies. A Memorial presents the initial case framing and responding to the points at issue. A
Counter-Memorialresponds to the adversary's Memorial and strengthens the case initially
expressed in one's own Memorial.A Reply responds to the adversary's challenges mounted in
its Counter-Memorialand further sharpens arguments central to ones own case.
49. Feldman &Colson supranote 5, at 758-59.
50. Robinson et al, supra note 7, at 591.
51. Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31. See also Memorial Submitted by the
United States of America 201 (Sept. 27,1982) (on file with lead author) [hereinafter US. Mem.].
52. Robinson et al., supra note 7, at 591 n.38. Canada had expanded its initial boundary
claim in the middle of negotiations with the United States in 1977 on the basis of the United
Kingdom-Francearbitral tribunal decision. Once negotiations failed and the two parties turned
to the court, the United States also expanded its claim. The Reagan administration had come
into power by that time, so one could speculate that part of the reasoning behind the revision
was to counterbalance the perceived failure of the Carter Administration to respond in kind
to Canada's earlier expansion of its claim. Regardless, both sides were adapting to what they
perceived in the unfolding conflict situation as opportunities and restraints for making the
most compelling justifications on behalf of maximum, legally plausible claims. For discussions
of the boundary shifts, see id. at 591; Schneider, supra note 11, at 544-48.
53. Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31.
54. Id.
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United States strategists also developed a historical argument that
would have had special resonance with political constituencies.' They
argued that Georges Bank is an important historic site to Americans as
evidenced by their "dominance" in a range of activities in the Gulf area,
including development of the fisheries.' After all, the United States would
argue, New England's "dominant" relationship to the Georges Bank
fisheries was initiated before the American Revolution and continued
without interruption until the mid-1950s with Canada's "intrusion."" As
U.S. Agent Davis Robinson eventually put this point to the tribunal,
Georges Bank was as "American as apple pie."'
B. The United States Rhetorical Strategy Enacted
The United States found a strategy for adapting to both legal and
political audiences in a structure based on a geometrical kind of geography.
That structure advanced a boundary claim based on a line perpendicular to
the general direction of the coastline, but adjusted to maintain the
"ecological integrity" of fishing banks in the area." This new structure
allowed greater emphasis on geographical factors-whose importance was
implied by relevant law--and de-emphasis of geological factors. The United
States then argued that the Northeast Channel constituted an identifiable
"natural boundary" between "ecological regimes" at Georges Bank and on
the Scotian shelf.' The revised U.S. proposal encompassed a larger portion
of the Gulf's interior area than the initial claim and retained all of Georges
edge of the Northeast
Bank by running the line along the northeastern
Channel, rather than directly through it. 6"
According to Mr. Colson, the adjusted perpendicular line furnished
an excellent framework for attaching a panoply of supportive arguments for
the claim to Georges Bank in its entirety.' Of particular interest is an
unprecedented line of argument that attempted to turn fisheries
conservation and management into a legal principle for maritime boundary
delimitation. The United States premised that argument on the 200-mile
"Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ). The EEZ had the intent, the United
States was to contend, of promoting better conservation and management

55. id.
56. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 41-74.
57. Id. at 41-55.
58. Argument of Mr. Robinson, (Can. v. U.S.) I.j. Pleadings (6 Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area) 231 (Apr. 11, 1984).
59. U.S. Mem.,supra note 51, at 179-85,205.
60. Id. at 201,209-10.
61. Id. at 185,189 fig.30.
62. Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31.
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of fish stocks by putting them under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal
states.6 Single-state management, especially within the migratory range of
fish stocks, was thought preferable to purportedly ineffective bilateral
management regimes. As Colson recalled, more time and personnel were
devoted to that argument than any other in the case." With that argument,
the United States could, at one stroke, tempt the tribunal to endorse a new
legal precedent in maritime boundary law that would culminate in the
United States securing all of Georges Bank while also placating domestic
political audiences, which believed that an acceptable outcome amounted
to no less than exclusive "rights" to the entire Bank. As Colson put it,
[flisheries management was a very important part of the U.S.
case presentation. This was the first case about 200 mile
fishing zones. From a legal view and from a political point of
view-to satisfy New England political interests
watching-we tried to make the historical case for Georges
Bank being the United States' from time immemorial. Then tie
in with reasons the international community created the 200
mile zones in the first place: to improve conservation and
management of resources. The premise was to give one
nation complete control of the stock. This cut our way.65
U.S. strategists built a bold case that was plausible on legal grounds
and acceptable to domestic political audiences. However, they also knew
that a plausible case did not amount to a probable outcome. Arguing
exclusive control before an international court that privileged cooperation
over exclusivity is a difficult persuasive obstacle. The geographical structure
of the case, together with the novel inducement of a precedent rooted in
fisheries conservation, was an attempt to surmount that obstacle.
Meanwhile, efforts were made to ensure that fishing groups respected the
case and would accept the results regardless of outcome. Fishing groups
were briefed as the case developed and read legal pleadings before they
were filed with the court." Thus, efforts were made to ensure the political
acceptability of the State Department's efforts 7

63. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 119-20; Reply Submitted by the United States of America
81-82 (Dec. 12, 1983) (on file with lead author) [hereinafter US. Reply].
64. Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Canadian legal strategists also perceived political pressures behind the bold case the
Americans put forward. For example, Mr. Leonard Legault, Canada's Agent in the Gulf case,
put it this way:
They had rejected everything but the all or nothing approach when they
rejected the East Coast Fisheries Agreement. They had to go out and do
everything they could to justify that decision in many ways. And that
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In summary, the decision to put the fisheries conflict before a
Chamber was a strategy designed to resolve the political problem while
minimizing any possible consequences from a decision that would likely
turn out less than optimum from the vantage of interested constituencies.
It was not, however, a means to a solution of the fisheries problem.
II. THE LEGAL APPROACH: FRAMING LINEAR ARGUMENTS
Once in court, the Unites States and Canada sought to make the
strongest cases possible to redeem their respective boundary claims. Both
parties began with pre-established claims and then created lines of
argument to justify them. That linear mode of argumentation reduced the
complex fisheries problem to an array of separate and disconnected
arguments about geography, ecology, economics, and history that were
designed and incorporated within the two respective cases in view of
strategic, persuasive impact. Ultimately, one consequence was that the two
parties argued at cross purposes about what aspects of the problem were
relevant in the case, thus concealing relationships among these and other
components of what in fact is an integrated system in which the fish are but
one component. We shall illustrate with two arguments that the parties
incorporated into the geographical structures of their cases: the U.S.
conservation argument and the Canadian socioeconomic argument.'
A. The U.S. Conservation Argument
The United States contended that the 1982 Law of the Sea
Conference, which generated a new category of international law-the
Exclusive Economic Zone--endorsed the "equitable" principle of
conservation," The United States maintained that the EEZs were advocated
to promote better conservation and management through single-state

complicated their effort I am sure, psychologically. They really had to do
everything they could to ensure that every last parcel of what was Georges
Bank would fall to their exclusive dominion.
Interview with LH. Legault, Agent and Counsel for Canada in the Gulf of Maine
case, in Ottawa, Ontario, Can. (Aug. 18, 1997).
68. Maritime boundary disputes involve geographical arguments that tend to follow two
kinds of geometrical reasoning patterns: one party argues that the boundary should follow an
equidistant line between points located along the two parties' coastlines; the other party evokes
a geometrical principle other than equidistance as the basis for creating the boundary. For a
discussion regarding geometrical concepts and methods relevant to boundary delimitation see
Leonard Legault & Blair Hankey, Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionalityin
MaritimeDelimitation, in I INTERNATIONAL MARfTIM BOUNDARIES, supranote 15, at 203-41.
69. U.S. Mem, supranote 51, at 119-20,213; U.S. Rep., supranote 63, at 81-82,165.
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jurisdiction over the resources adjacent to their coasts.' Based on that
principle, the United States proposed a boundary running perpendicular to
the general direction of the coast, but adjusted to maintain the integrity of
fishing banks in the area.' This proposal was based on the theory that
"primary" coastlines, or those that follow the general direction of the coast,
are relevant to the boundary delimitation while "secondary" coasts running
counter to that direction are irrelevant; thus, Maine and New Hampshire
possess "primary" coastlines while the opposite coasts of Massachusetts
and southwestern Nova Scotia are "secondary."' But if the boundary were
run from the agreed-upon starting point seaward on a line perpendicular
to the primary coasts, the fishing banks adjacent to Nova Scotia would be
divided. Citing the Grisbadarna case as precedent, 3 the United States
adjusted the perpendicular line to avoid splitting the banks on the Scotian
Shelf, giving Canada exclusive control.74 Thus, the U.S. claim "respected"
the integrity of the Scotian Shelf "ecological regime" while gaining
exclusive control over the Georges Bank regime, affording both countries
the potential for better conservation and management of fishstocks through
single-state jurisdiction.'
The U.S. effort to turn conservation and management into a legal
principle for boundary delimitation needed convincing depiction of
circumstances in the Gulf's marine environment that would make its
application relevant to the case. In its Memorial, the United States
contended that the Northeast Channel influenced water circulation patterns
in the Gulf of Maine in ways that shaped communities of flora and fauna
within three "identifiable" and "separate"ecological regimes.' Of special
interest were three gyres formed by current dynamics and distinguished by
salinity, density, and temperature gradients; they were located at Georges
Bank, the Gulf of Maine Basin, and the Scotian Shelf.r! "Fronts" occur
"between the waters of Georges Bank and those of the Scotian Shelf" and,
to slightly less extent, "between the waters of Georges Bank and those of the
Gulf of Maine Basin."-' Phytoplankton, the basis of aquatic food chains,

70. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 119-20; U.S. Rep., supra note 63, at 8142.
71. U.S. Mere., supra note 51, at 179.

72. Id.at 19-20,140,169-174,179,191-193.
73. The Grisbadarna Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague CtL Rep. (Scott) 121 (TRb. Arb. 1909).
See U.S. Mem., supranote 51, at 104-15,121,143.
74. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 179.
75. Single-state jurisdiction within the migratory or life cycle range of commercial fish
stocks was thought preferable to two-state jurisdiction because it did not create the
transboundary problem of subjecting living resources to overlapping management regimes.
76. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 27.
77. Id. at 27-28, 31.
78. Id. at 31.
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have limited locomotive powers; so the gyres will retain them.7
Accordingly, wherever phytoplankton concentrate, zooplankton and fish
will follow .' Based on such reasoning, the United States claimed that the
"natural boundary" at the Northeast Channel and three ecological regimes,
including the two the Channel purportedly divided-Georges Bank and the
Scotian Shelf-were circumstances relevant to the boundary delimitation."
The United States stressed the paramount importance of the Northeast
Channel as "a natural division between separate stocks of fish and shellfish
found in the respective ecological regimes of Georges Bank and of the
Scotian Shelf."182 Twelve of sixteen commercially important fish species
purportedly had separate stocks on Georges Bank and, thus, were
"divided" from stocks on the Scotian Shelf by the "natural boundary" at the
Northeast Channel."3 Therefore, the United States argued that "the
Northeast Channel is a natural boundary between fishing activities as well
as a natural division between the commercial fish stocks of Georges Bank
and the stocks of the Scotian Shelf,""6 and that "division of stocks at the
Northeast Channel makes it both possible and appropriate to manage the
stocks over Georges Bank separately from the stocks over the Scotian
Shelf."' s
The bold strategy of attempting to turn resource conservation and
management into a legal principle for maritime boundary delimitation
yielded a boundary that left Georges Bank fish stocks under exclusive U.S.
jurisdiction. What if Canada's alternative boundary, based on equidistance,
were adopted? The ecological system at Georges Bank would be split,
exposing its fish stocks to the ineffectiveness of different management
regimes. Dr. Robert Edwards, chief U.S. science advisor on the case,
summed up the reasoning behind the overall argument: "How important
is it to manage resources appropriately? And how do you achieve this?
That's the question you're dealing with. And you don't achieve it by
artificially cutting into two jurisdictions many major stocks. That's the
issue."86

79. Id. at 31, 35. For the U.S. use of remotely sensed satellite data on chlorophyll
concentrations to mark out boundaries among ecological regimes, see id. at 31, 33 fig.6.
80. Id. at 31-32.
at 36, 39.
81. Id.
82. ld. at 35.
83. Id. at 36,37 fig.7.
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id. at 40.
86. Interview with Robert Edwards, Science Expert for the United States in the Gulf of
Maine case, in Woods Hole, Mass. (Aug. 8, 1997).
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B. Canada's Socioeconomic Argument
Central to Canada's case was the argument that the 200-mile
"distance" criterion is the sole basis of title for fisheries zones and an
effective basis for jurisdiction over the seabed as well."' According to this
criterion, "distance from the coast is necessarily an important factor in
assessing which state has the stronger claim in areas of overlapping
seaward extensions. " 88 Put simply, the coasts closest to the disputed area
have greater relevance to the boundary delimitation. In practical terms, the
geographically opposite coasts of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia were
relevant to the boundary delimitation; the so-called "primary"coasts of
Maine and New Hampshire, which the United States advocated, were not. 9
Canada's use of the distance principle enabled a synthesis of
geographical and economic considerations. In the Gulf of Maine, coastal
areas nearest the disputed zones also had greater economic interests in
those zones.' The "wings" of southwestern Nova Scotia and the opposite
Massachusetts coasts had stronger economic relationships with Georges
Bank than "interior" coastlines along Maine, New Hampshire, and New
Brunswick." But the geographical and economic symmetry of those coastal
wings was not matched by relative economic dependency.' Small rural
communities along southwestern Nova Scotia's coast had an "economy"
and "way of life irrevocably tied to the resources of the sea."' 3 In contrast,
fisheries concentrated in New Bedford, Gloucester, and Boston were
"insignificant in the context of the dense and urbanized population of
Massachusetts, with its industrialized and diversified economic base."'
Accordingly, the Canadians contended that the greater economic
importance of Georges Bank to southwestern Nova Scotia compared with
New England was a relevant circumstance for boundary delimitation.5 As
Canada put it,
[tihe fishing industry is the leading employer in Nova Scotia
in the primary and secondary industrial sectors, and Georges
Bank is the single most valuable fishing ground available to
Nova Scotia fishermen. The heartland of this industry lies in

87. Memorial Submitted by Canada 123-27, 131-34 (Sept. 27, 1982) (on file with lead
author) [hereinafter Can. Mere.].
88. Schneider, supra note 11, at 555.
89. Can. Mem, supranote 87, at 138,146-148.
90. Id. at 29, 131-134.
91. Id. at 27-28,147,148 fig.34.
92. Id. at 36.
93. Id. at 32.
94. Id. at 36.
95. Id. at 72-82,131-134.
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southwest Nova Scotia, in close proximity to Georges Bank.
In equity, these factors must surely be given great weight in
the balancing-up of all the relevant circumstances; for it is the
equitable character of the result that counts."
The Canadian socioeconomic or "human geography" argument
underscored the purported inequity of accepting the U.S. boundary claim
to all of Georges Bank. Nothing short of economic calamity would befall the
rustic little communities of southwestern Nova Scotia if the United States
won its entire claim. Canada's pleadings raised the specter of empty coastal
communities drained of life once economically displaced people migrated
away out of dire necessity to find alternative ways of earning a living. Mr.
Blair Hankey, one of Canada's legal strategists and pleaders, explained the
strategy behind the "economic dependence" argument:
To some extent our argument was "We're poor, you're rich."
Of course, we didn't put it in those terms. That would have
been too crude and.. surely irrelevant. But that was the
underlying sort of idea. You know, we're a poor rural
economy in Nova Scotia.. .New England's big and
diverse... We know what Massachusetts is. Boston is the great
economic center, a very, very rich place. And the scallops
fishery doesn't count for much in the.. .Massachusetts
economy."
In sum, Mr. Hankey said, Canada "attempted to win the hearts and minds
of the judges, or the hearts more than the minds, with that argument.""
C. Contested Grounds of Relevancy
Canada and the United States contested each others arguments
about relevant circumstances in the case. Canada challenged the U.S.
equitable principle of conservation, maintaining that the EEZs were
designed more to foster the economies of coastal states rather than the
conservation of resources. Moreover, Canada contended that the notion of
the Northeast Channel as a "natural boundary" between discrete ecological
regimes was a "myth" irrelevant to the decision." In any case, Canada
argued that single-state management approaches are not more effective than
bilateral management regimes in conserving living resources likely to,

96. Id. at 133.
97. Interview with Blair Hankey, Deputy-Agent for Canada in the Gulf of Maine case, in
Ottawa, Ontario, Can. (Aug. 18,1997).
98. Id.
99. Reply Submitted by Canada 65-72, 73-84 (Dec. 12, 1983) (on file with lead author)
[hereinafter Can. Rep.].
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traverse legal boundariesY'0° The United States sought to blunt the impact
of Canada's economic dependence argument by redirecting the tribunals
attention to vast open waters in Canada's undisputed possession northeast
of the Gulf of Maine area." It was also stressed that the United States had
"complete dominance" in a range of activities in the Gulf, particularly in
development of the fisheries. 2
Several lawyers speculated that Canada's arguments about
economic dependence and purported willingness to cooperate in joint
management of the fisheries were more persuasive with the tribunal than
U.S. contentions about "dominance" and exclusive managerial control.' As
Mr. Legault put it, "'Dominance' and 'equity,' and especially'dominance,'
with its overtones of domination, are not terribly compatible terms. It's
really hard to make an equity argument on that basis."' Mr. Colson
conceded, "We argued exclusivity, which isn't effective in an international
court. Cooperation is privileged in international fora-but joint
management is terrible."' o
The rhetorical demands of legal pleading virtually require that
geography, ecology, economics, and history become strategic resources for
generating arguments aimed at redeeming preconceived claims. The very
components of an ecologically informed conservation regime that must be
exemplified and interrelated are instead rendered into separate and
disconnected arguments about legal relevance. Setting aside questions
about legal relevance, those components are relevant to the natural reality
of the dispute over the Gulf of Maine fisheries whose primary cause is
decline of the fish stocks. For instance, probing the relationships between
economics and marine ecology regardless of jurisdictional claims is
required to gamer understanding of that cause. In any case, marine ecology
and economics are but two among several components whose
interrelationships can define the complex problems involved in sustaining
the Gulf's fisheries-a point that is lost when argumentation is reduced to
linear reasoning in strategic service to preestablished claims.

100. Counter-Memorial Submitted by Canada 93-99 (June 28, 1983) (on file with lead
author) [hereinafter Can. CM].
101. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 41; Counter-Memorial Submitted by the United States of
America 74-76 (June 28,1983) (on file with lead author) [hereinafter U.S. CM].
102. U.S. Mem., supra note 51, at 41-74,81-82. See also U.S. CM, supra note 101, at 47-48.
103. Interview with LIH. Legault, supranote 67; Interview with Blair Hankey, supranote
97; Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
104. Interview with L.11 Legault, supra note 67.
105. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
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ll. THE RHETORIC OF COMPROMISE AND THE CHAMBER'S
STANDARD OF JUDGMENT
The World Court rendered a four-to-one decision that located the
boundary between the two parties' competing claims such that the United
States received more miles than an even split.' The United States received
about 61 percent of the disputed part of the Bank, while Canada received
the northeast peak-the site of a valuable scallop fishery.' ° ' One of the
judges later characterized the decision as, in effect, succeeding in putting an
end to a "knotty and difficult" political dispute.'/8 But commentators
questioned both the legal reasoning supporting the decision'es and how the
Chamber handled the very issues that generated the dispute in the first
place-issues associated with the fisheries."0 We contend that insight is
gained by considering the court's decision as strategic rhetoric adapted to
fit political and legal constraints; a rhetoric that diverted from the court's
consideration the limits to which natural resources in question could be
sustainably exploited.
A. The Chamber's Strategic Rhetoric of Compromise
The court's decision can be viewed as an exercise in strategic
rhetoric that is adapted to both political and legal constraints. Both U.S. and
Canadian respondents acknowledged that they believed that the court was
likely to search their arguments for means with which to fashion a legal

106. Judge Gros dissented, arguing that the line should follow strict equidistance
methodology, giving Canada its entire claim. Gulf of Maine, supra note 2, at 360-90. judge
Schwebel voted with the majority, but filed a separate opinion to contend that the court
reasoned inequitably about coastline proportionality when it included an expanse of the Bay
of Fundy's coastline in the calculation. Id. at 353-59.
107. Robinson et aL, supra note 7, at 581. For a breakdown of stock distributions for the

Bank as a whole, see Springer, supra note 13, at 225.
108. Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 81 AM.J.
NT'L L. 831,846 (1987).
109. For example, McHugh generally agreed with the Gros dissent that the court went
beyond the bounds of law to advance its own ideas of equity, stressing that the two parties did
not grant the court such power in the special agreement, which specified that the decision be
based on the law. See McHugh, supranote 11, at 1035-38.
110. In his study showing that fisheries issues have had minimal impact on maritime
boundary delimitations, Churchill observed that the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case
"almost wholly rejected" efforts by the two parties to get the court to consider fisheries issues.
IR.Churchill, FisheriesIssues in MaritimeDelimitation,14 MARINE POL'Y 44, 53 (1993). Herbert
contended that "the sole use of geography in the boundary decision meant that the key issues
of the dispute, specifically resource allocation and control, were given the least weight in its
resolution." Herbert, supra note 14, at 309. See aLso McDorman et aL, supra note 19, at 91.
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rationale for a compromise decision."' Indeed, that belief seems warranted
by remarks made to US. Agent Robinson by one of the judges during a
cocktail party after the case ended: "My dear Mr. Robinson, from the outset
we had only one aim. Equal disappointment. Equal disappointment."" 2Mr.
Colson also acknowledged that the court could not give the entire claim to
one of two parties locked in political conflict over rich fisheries. As he put
it, "if the United States got everything, they would have screwed Canada
and they won't do that."1 Political
reasons, he thought, worked against a
3
winner-take-all solution.
The court had to render a decision that met both political and legal
demands. Indeed, the role of the pleaders seemed partly to furnish the
Chamber with an array of possible constructive and refutative arguments
from which it could fashion a compelling legal rationale for warranting a
compromise decision. This view of rhetorical practices before the tribunal
was common among respondents, although attitudes about those practices
ranged from frustration about politicized justice to satisfaction that equity
and fairness were served. Mr. Hankey captured the dynamic rhetorical
process in which the tribunal sifts through competing arguments in a search
for grounds from which to warrant a decision that meets both political and
legal constraints:
It may well be that the Americans carried the day on [the
ecology arguments], we carried the day ultimately on the
socioeconomic [arguments]. So maybe in a way those two
arguments perhaps canceled each other out....And so the
Court said neither of them are relevant. So they went for
geography.. .Ithink they went for the geography partly, mind
you, because the judicial precedents tended to suggest that
was the thing to do, but they had a chance to really form the
law. They could have gone in a different direction if they
wanted to, I think. But I think they did it with that kind of
geography-which was totally unscientific-because they
could do almost anything they wanted with it. And they did.
They came out with the result that they thought, that Ago
thought, was politically acceptable and that they just used the
geography as the rationalization. But I don't think they could
have done that-to toot my own horn a bit-if we hadn't been
effective at blunting the American [geographical]
argument... .We gave them a lot to work with. That they

111. Interview with Ray A. Meyer, Attorney-Adviser for the United States in the Gulf of
Maine case, in Washington, D.C. (uly 28,1997); Interview with Davis Robinson, supra note 43;
Interview with David A. Coson, supranote 31; Interview with Blair Hankey, supra note 97.
112. Interview with Davis Robinson, supranote 43.
113. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31.
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could use. That Ago could use. We gave them lots of tools
and they did use them."
Mr. Meyer, a U.S. lawyer, exhibited a contrary attitude about the same.
rhetorical practice:
When we got to the Hague and came into the Courtroom for
the first day of arguments, the pleadings were before the
judges, stacked up. The Canadian pleadings were wrapped
with plastic. That's how they were given; shrink wrapped.
None of them were open. And I assume ours hadn't been
either. So, these guys really didn't pay much attention to any
of those sorts of arguments [i.e., the economic and biological].
They listened to the oral arguments, asked a few questions,
and then went back and said, "Well, how are we going to
solve this problem? How are we going to split the difference
in a way that we can support, at least ostensively, in terms of
the law." 15
Mr. Meyer observed that the Chamber relied on geographical arguments,
and speculated that they turned to the detailed stacks of pleadings only
after oral arguments "to find citations that would support whatever result
they wanted to come out with.""' Based on these commentaries, the role of
the lawyers was to furnish the court with an array of possible arguments for
developing a rationale for an otherwise preconceived compromise
judgment.
What emerges from this analysis is a view of the Chamber as one
struggling to balance equities or otherwise secure some form of
compromise that would successfully end the political conflict. The court
seemingly decided where to place the line based on concerns about equity
or politics and then "reasoned backwards" to find a supportive legal
rationale. And the process worked: a boundary was imposed, ending the
political problem. However, the natural resource problem, with its
interconnected elements of economics and ecology, remained.
B. The Chamber's Standard of Judgment
The Chamber had an opportunity to make new law within the
unique circumstances of a case that involved imposition of a single
boundary that decided jurisdiction over both continental shelf and fisheries
resources. But the Chamber also lacked a mandate either through special
agreement by the parties, legal precedents, or based on the parties'

114. Interview with Blair Hankey, supranote 97.
115. Interview with Ray A. Meyer, supra note 111.

116. Id.
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pleadings to render a decision that addressed the systemic causes of the
problem to sustain the Gulf of Maine fisheries. Instead, the tribunal had to
render a decision that adjusted to opportunities and restraints afforded by
both legal and political circumstances.
The Chamber based its decision on a "fundamental norm" 'in
international maritime boundary law that boundaries should be determined
through agreement or through a competent third party "by the application
of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of ensuring,
with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and other relevant
circumstances, an equitable result."117 The Chamber contended in its
decision that both parties agreed with that general norm but erred by
searching beyond it to locate detailed rules in international law that could
warrant their respective claims." 8 The court's overall critique applied to the
major arguments the parties advanced in their cases. Canadian and U.S.
efforts to find rules of law in geography were deemed "preconceived
assertions rather than.. .convincing demonstration."'" In particular,
Canada's "distance" principle was but a thinly veiled attempt to turn
equidistance-a "practical method"-into a general rule of law.' The U.S.
theory of "primary" and "secondary" coastal fronts was "unacceptable both
in geography and in law." 2 ' Moreover, the court's critique applied to both
the socioeconomic and conservation arguments:
Each Party's reasoning is in fact based on a false premise. The
error lies precisely in searching general international law for,
as it were, a set of rules which are not there. This observation
applies particularly to certain "principles" advanced by the
Parties as constituting well-established rules of law, e.g., the
idea advocated by Canada that a single maritime boundary
should ensure the preservation of existing fishing patterns
which are vital to the coastal communities in the area
concerned, or the idea advocated by the United States that
such a boundary should make it possible to ensure the
optimum conservation and management of living resources
and at the same time reduce the potential for future disputes
between the parties."u
The Chamber dismissed the two parties' major arguments. The court found
that claims to historical dominance and pleas of socioeconomic dependence

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

GulfofMaine, supra note 2, at 300.
Id. at 295-96,299.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 296-98.
Id.at 298.
Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

were irrelevant for determining the boundary,"2 ' concluding that "the
respective scale of activities connected with fishing-or navigation, defence
or, for that matter, petroleum exploration and exploitation-cannot be
taken into account as a relevant circumstance or.. .an equitable criterion.. .in
determining the delimitation line."' 24The Chamber also dismissed the U.S.
conservation argument as lacking both factual and legal substance and
flatly rejected the crucial "natural boundary" claim."' 2 ' Indeed, the
Chamber added that even with convincing proof of a natural boundary, "It
must.. .be emphasized that a delimitation, whether of a maritime boundary
or of a land boundary, is a legal-political operation, and that it is not the
case that where a natural boundary is discernable, the political delimitation
necessarily had to follow the same line."" Leaving aside the quality of the
ecological and economic arguments, the point is that they were largely
irrelevant to criteria applied by the court in actually constructing the
boundary.11'
Having dismissed the parties' major arguments, the court found its
equitable criterion in "the geography of coasts, which has primarily a
physical aspect, to which may be added, in the second place, a political
aspect." "' The geography of coasts purportedly had the advantage of being
"neutral" since it was not biased toward either of the two objects being
divided in the case: the water column and the underlying continental
shelf."' Accordingly, that decision criterion could yield a single maritime
boundary for both seabed and water column resources. The "political
aspect" of geography was associated with accepted and noncontroversial
boundaries that could be located on a map. Within that geographical
framework, the Chamber formulated "a criterion which need only be stated
to be seen as intrinsically equitable:"' 3 "equal division of areas where the
maritime projections of the coasts of the States between which delimitation
is to be effected converge and overlap."' 31 Since the boundary must conform
with the geographical realities of the particular case, "auxiliary criteria" also

123.
124.

Id. at 340-42.
Id. at 342.

125. Id. at 277.
126. Id.
127. The court did acknowledge that although criteria such as those adduced by the United
States and Canada did not apply to actual delimitation of boundaries, they still in particular
circumstances could posit "valid considerations of a political and economic character" for
testing the equity of results once a boundary is reached through geographical criteria. That
qualification applied especially to socioeconomic criteria, but the court maintained such
criteria did not apply to the Gulf of Maine case. Id. at 277-78, 342-43.
128. Id. at 327.
129. Id.
130. Id.at 328.
131. Id. at 327.
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are needed to ensure that a "genuinely equitable" delimitation is
achieved." In the Gulf of Maine case, those corrective criteria are the
disparate U.S. and Canadian coastline lengths, avoidance of inappropriate
"cut offs" of coastal fronts, and accounting for the presence of islands.'
To give effect to the equitable criterion of "equal division" and
auxiliary geographical criteria required a method as purportedly "neutral"
as the criteria themselves. Therefore, the Court chose "geometrical"
methods." Variable coastal relationships in the Gulf of Maine required
different geometric procedures to execute an equitable boundary." The
result was a three-segment boundary: the northeastern segment was
adjusted to laterally adjacent coastlines; the second segment used a median
line between opposite Massachusetts and southwestern Nova Scotian
coastlines (but corrected to apply the auxiliary criteria of the relatively
larger U.S. coastline and the presence of islands in the Gulf area); and the
third segment was a line drawn perpendicular to the court's "closing" line
to the Gulf, extending out to a terminal point in the agreed upon triangular
36
area.

1

IV. SCIENCE AND THE DEMANDS OF LEGAL PLEADING
The Gulf of Maine case is an excellent example both of how parties
to a dispute use science strategically to buttress their cases and of
constraints upon the court's handling of science issues in rendering its
decision.
A. The Parties' Strategic Use of Science
This case illustrates how science is used strategically to furnish
evidence in support of the lawyers' preestablished claims. For a general
example, we can infer with some confidence that the United States would
not have sought evidence for "natural boundaries" from ecology and other
sciences if that evidence could not have been depicted in a manner that
somehow comported with its legal boundary claim. At a more specific level,
we can glean insight into this process of reducing science to the strategic,
rhetorical function of providing evidence in support of preestablished
claims by looking at tensions that arose between legal strategists and
science advisors over what could legitimately be claimed as science.
132.

Id. at 327-28.

133.

Id.

134. Id.at 329.

135. Id. at 330-31.
136. For the court's reasoning behind the construction of its tluee-segment line,see id. at
331-39.
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Typically, the lawyers invented the leading arguments and sought to
structure them categorically to draw conclusions that distinguished sharply
between truth and falsehood, fact and fiction, reality and myth. Mr. Colson
put it this way:
Lawyers always want clear and sharp lines-this is the way
it is! Science advisors know there is an exception to every rule
and don't want to give this to the lawyers. This is true of all
expert witnesses....Lawyers wanted more from the
experts-answers that would categorically defend the U.S.
position.1 37
Lawyers struggled with their scientific experts for evidentiary
support as they developed their arguments. Mr. Colson commented that
scientists "thought if they did a bang up presentation for their peers, that
would also meet requirements of this case. But this didn't add up to being
useful for argumentation."1 3 Science that is useful for argumentation meets
the standard of furthering the strategic, persuasive impact of preconceived
claims. According to Mr. Hankey, scientists understood this rhetorical
standard when they furnished evidence for arguments invented selectively
by the lawyers:
He understood that his job was to produce selective evidence.
To ignore some evidence and to look for others. And they
cooperated with that, the scientists and historians. They
understood that their job was to help us win a case and that's
the only reason they were involved. We weren't looking for
the truth. We did want to know the truth because we wanted
to know what arguments the Americans would raise. We
wanted to know how our arguments would be rebutted. We
wanted to know the truth but we didn't want to necessarily
tell the truth. We knew we had to be selective and they
3
understood that and they generally played along with it.19
Scientists viewed this process differently, seeing themselves caught
periodically in struggles over what legitimately could be claimed about
their technical fields. The lawyers' rhetorical demand for categorical truth
clashed with the more nuanced, qualified, and tentative judgments that
scientists make before their peers. Dr. Robert Edwards, the chief U.S.
science advisor, pointed to disciplinary differences about the
epistemological meaning of legitimate scientific claims as the source of

137.
138.
139.

Interview with David A. Colson, supra note 31.

Id.
Interview with Blair Hankey, supra note 97.
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tensions between lawyers and scientists when they together confronted the
constraints of pleading before a court:
The academic scientist, you know, wrestles on the edge of an
abyss. Constantly confronting one another and arguing about
what the real answer is. And as you fully understand, they're
not arguing about the truth. They're arguing about
probability. And that's all we scientists talk about. What is the
most likely causal factor. Not what is the truth. So the one
place where lawyers and scientists differ is that lawyers have
their sense of truth and it's developed by the mores of
society... .We don't. We develop a concept of probability. So
there is the difference."®
Dr. Michael Sinclair, the chief science advisor for Canada, also commented
that disciplinary differences between scientists and lawyers are the source
of struggles over what can be legitimately claimed as science in the
courtroom:
One of the surprising things that I found is the lawyers aren't
used to peer review. So they're not-used to being criticized.
And scientists, particularly in the fisheries area, are very used
to having our work put forward and saying, "Well, that
doesn't represent what the rest of the people think. Go back
and do something else.". ..So I was a little surprised that
lawyers could be thin skinned about being criticized. Perhaps
the more substantive issue.. was the lawyers being forced to
back off. They wanted to make a point in an area and they
wanted to push the point, and forcing lawyers to back off and
say, "No, you can't have that one.""
Scientists on both sides struggled with the problem of making
technical claims that were consistent with the broader consensus of
particular scientific fields. That problem is magnified with sciences related
to fisheries. There, the tension between what Dr. Edwards called the
lawyers' common sense "truth" perspective and scientists' "probable"
perspective is even more pronounced:
The point is that between us there was this enormous gap .... I
had to back off of the edge of that abyss and present.. .the
consensus of feeling about what was represented here. I
couldn't afford to argue about whether or not stock A and
stock B were totally separate because they had 90 percent
different genes. No, that wasn't that kind of argument at all.
140. Interview with Robert Edwards, supra note 86.
141. Interview with M. Sinclair, Science Expert for Canada in the Gulf of Maine case, in
Bedford, Nova Scotia, Can. (Aug. 1, 1997).
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You have to move back to the point where you're comfortable
that you're speaking of the consensus of what we understand
today. There are no rigid, you know, precepts here at all. So
that's where the difference lies and that's where I think you
have trouble when you go into something like the Court and
you try to talk about ecological issues.'
Dr. Sinclair explained his own struggles to remain consistent with the
consensus of relevant fields while lawyers looked to make more robust
claims. He, like Dr. Edwards, worried about moving beyond that which is
"defensible" because it is consistent with available literature and thus
"tumbling over the edge to mislead." He handled the problem this way:
The philosophy I took, and I think all of our team did, was
that if we had to swear on the Bible for any comment that was
in the Memorial or Countermemorial on the technical issues,
that we could in all honesty say that this was an
interpretation that was consistent with the scientific literature.
So, you know, there are judgment calls here all the time, and
that's why they were pushing how far we could go and be
able to say this is an acceptable interpretation of scientific
information. But we basically just said this is where we'll go
and no further. And they accepted that, I mean I think they
were probing, sometimes disappointed, but they had to
accept it.'43
Mr. John Crook, a State Department lawyer, reflected on his own
experience in international cases and put the general point about
disciplinary divisions quite well when he said,
The problem is that lawyers are trying to make scientists or
experts of any other kind jump through their peculiar legal
hoops, and the peculiar legal hoops may have very little
correspondence with what the expert believes are the real
questions ....You've got two different guys who are coming at
it with very different orientations and sets of assumptions
and objectives, and trying
to marry it up. It is an inherently
process.1t
difficult and frustrating
Regardless of how scientists and lawyers ironed out their
disciplinary differences when formulating the specific details of particular
evidential claims, one point about this process emerges as nearly
incontrovertible: the lawyers' predetermined claims tended to constrain

142. Interview with Robert Edwards, supra note 86.
143. Id.
144. Interview withjohnCrook, Office of Legal Adviser, United States Departmentof State,
in Washington, D.C. (uly 28,1997).
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what science became relevant for evidentiary use far more than conclusions
about science constrained how the lawyers framed their claims. This point
becomes all the more significant in view of how the judges themselves
handled matters of science in the Gulf of Maine case.
B. Barriers to the Court's Use of Science
The experienced international lawyers interviewed stressed that
international judges, unlike their domestic counterparts in criminal and civil
courts, lack staff needed to conduct research and check purported facts. "
With limited staff and funding, they can easily become overwhelmed when
confronted with volumes of written and oral pleadings containing scientific
arguments about complex factual issues and appended with hundreds of
technical diagrams.146 To "try the facts" under those circumstances risks
embarrassment should the Chamber incorporate "facts" within a decision
which later turned out to be false. Mr. Alan Willis, one of Canada's legal
strategists, put this directly, "I think, in a sense-they never say this-but
I think the Courts are a little afraid of getting it wrong. Not only might they
misunderstand the scientific evidence, but the science itself might be
superseded in47 ten or fifteen years. And these [maritime] boundaries are
permanent."1

This concern increases with technical complexity. For instance, the
United States deployed remotely sensed satellite images in support of its
ecological boundary claims.a As Mr. Colson and others observed, that
tactic might have impeded rather than strengthened the U.S. effort to make
ecology relevant to the case since the court might have feared "having the
wool pulled over their eyes" by U.S. technological proficiency."'
Any hesitancy on the court's part in handling science claims would
have put U.S. lawyers at a tactical disadvantage since they had to make
positive technical arguments supporting their bold theory that conservation
was an equitable principle. The Canadians merely needed to create
ambiguity or doubt about those arguments in rebuttal. Particularly
145.

Interview with David A. Colson supranote 31; Interview with Davis Robinson, supra

note 43.
146. Interview with David A. Colson, supranote 31; Interview with L Alan Willis, Counsel
and Special Adviser for Canada in the Gulf of Maine case, in Ottawa, Ontario, Can. (Aug. 18,

1997).
147. Interview with L.Alan Willis, supranote 146.
148. For examples, see U.S. Mem., supranote 51, at 31,33 fig.6; 1 Annexes to the CounterMemorial Submitted by the United States of America pt. A, annex 1, at 37,39 fig.11 (June 28,
1983) (on file with lead author); U.S. Rep., supra note 63, at 128, 129 fig.12, 131 fig.13; 2

Analytical Annexes to the Reply Submitted by the United States of America, annex 25, at 7, 11
fig.3,13 fig.4 (Dec. 12,1983) (on file with lead author).

149.

Interview with David A. Coson, supranote 31.
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vulnerable was the U.S. position that fish stocks within identifiable
ecological regimes were separated by the natural boundary at the Northeast
Channel. That position could not meet the clear and incontrovertible
standard imposed. Mr. Willis put it this way:
Everybody agreed there were three [ecological regimes]-the
inner Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank and Brown's
Bank-and it was true and they established it. But they
couldn't establish it as an absolute. I mean, it wasn't like [the
existence of] Australia and Asia... .They really couldn't
convince the Court that should be the basis of the maritime
boundary.'
Scientific claims subjected to rebuttal are likely to be dismissed as
unconvincing when a sufficient degree of doubt seeps in. For that reason,
Canada's rebuttal of the U.S. natural boundary claim as myth probably had
traction with the tribunal. The court's standard is revealed in the careful
wording of its finding on the natural boundary issue. The Chamber rejected
"the possibility of discerning any genuine, sure and stable 'natural
boundaries' in so fluctuating an environment as the waters of the ocean,
their flora and fauna,""5 1 and concluded that the result of the debate failed
"to clear away all doubt, at least as regards certain of the technical
aspects." 52 Apparently, only complete absence of doubt could attain the
level of clarity needed to warrant acceptance of the U.S. natural boundary
claim.
Preoccupation with getting the science "right" or, at the least,
avoiding getting it "wrong," will very likely continue to frustrate efforts to
incorporate ecology and ecosystem dynamics within future international
maritime boundary adjudications. Evoking ecological concerns in legal
pleadings will serve primarily rhetorical functions and otherwise lack
constraining influence. Mr. Meyer speculated that arguments incorporating
ecology or ecosystems might have rhetorical impact depending on whether
they resonate with judges' personal beliefs and attitudes:
They [ecosystem arguments] will be used in every case so
long as you continue to have the current system where the
adjudicators are asked to draw a line in the middle. Because
there will be pressure on everybody involved to throw in
every possible argument that might have an impact on the
decision maker. They had no discernable impact on those
decision makers [in the Gulf case], but that's because they
were who they were. You could have a situation next time
150. Interview with L Alan Willis, supra note 146.
151. Gulf of Maine, supranote 2, at 277.
152. Id.at 276-77.

Spring 20011

LESSONS FROM THE GULF OFMAINE

where you had somebody who was a real, you know,
environmentalist tree hugger, whale kisser type, who would
be impacted by those arguments. So you're not going to take
a chance. You're going to throw it all in.3
In the Gulf case, the two parties turned arguments about ecology
into strategic debating points that lacked influence on the outcome since the
tribunal itself lacked the expertise to render discriminating judgments about
the opposed positions. The adversarial proceedings were such that neither
the parties nor the Chamber could address the major problem of sustaining
fisheries resources in the Gulf of Maine.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: LESSONS FROM THE GREAT
LAKES FISHERIES
We have demonstrated that the International Court of Justice
Chamber system is not up to the challenge of solving U.S. and Canadian
problems associated with sustainable fisheries in the Gulf of Maine. The
court can successfully address a political agenda but is not equipped to
address the ecological context in which the consequences of over fishing are
made evident and within which they must be addressed. It can only "assign
blame" or attempt to "balance the equities" under prevailing international
law and in view of a politically acceptable compromise. Our conclusion is
that the Gulf of Maine fisheries case should not have been consigned to an
adjudicatory process. Thus, the question arises about available alternative
models for addressing the still ongoing problems in the Gulf's fisheries.
The approach the United States and Canada took to address the
Great Lakes fisheries crisis bears closer examination as a possible alternative
model. Our preliminary investigation of this model shows that it puts
institutional arrangements in place that foster four key rhetorical practices
directly contrary to those employed in the Gulf case. These are (1) the
parties' decision to focus on a perceived common threat to the fisheries as
the problem central to their deliberations, (2) adopting an ecosystem
approach that enabled them to exemplify and integrate different
components of the entire system of which the fisheries were important
parts, (3) using as shared judgment standards the conditions necessary for
a sustainable fishery, and (4) using bilateral science committees to guide
deliberations about the nature of the problem and the range of acceptable
remedies.
The institutional arrangements enabling these practices generated
a collaborative process of discussion and decision making that resulted in

153. Interview with Ray A. Meyer, supranote 111.
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an ecosystem approach to managing the fisheries. 1" We contend that this
approach warrants careful consideration as a model for addressing the
fisheries crisis in the Gulf of Maine today.'O
A. Framing the Natural Resource Problem in the Great Lakes Fisheries
The critical factor that spurred both parties to joint action was their
mutual perception that the problem in the Great Lakes Fisheries could not
be fixed by simply changing patterns of access, redistributing overall yield,
or blaming each other. The root of the problem, in this case, was an exotic
invader from the sea: the sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus). The sea
lamprey"-a large, primitive, eel-like parasite-entered the Great Lakes
system in the 1930s through man-made canals and locks."s As the
navigation system improved, the lamprey's access to the upper lakes was
ensured, reaching as far as Lake Superior by the late 1940s and causing
significant damage to highly valued fish species such as chub, lake trout,
and whitefish."7 For example, annual catches of lake trout fell from 15
million pounds in the Upper Lakes in the 1930s and 1940s to only about
300,000 pounds by the early 1 9 6 0 s."r
The devastation of the Great Lakes fisheries greatly concerned both
the United States and Canada. In marked contrast with the East Coast
Fisheries Agreement, deliberations about the problem centered attention on
the sea lamprey as though it was a common enemy, threatening the
interests of a wide range of stakeholders in the Great Lakes fisheries overall.
Accordingly, representatives of a wide range of U.S. local, state, and federal

154. The institutional arrangements did not initially incorporate an ecosystem approach
but the work of the GLFC evolved to acknowledge its necessity and facilitate its
implementation through its Joint Strategic Plan for the Great Lakes Fisheries. The approach
was first formally articulated in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1978 and was
amended by the 1987 Protocols.
155. There are, of course, significant differences between the Great Lakes and Gulf of
Maine situations. First, the Great Lakes are home to freshwater fisheries. Second, there has
developed a bio-regional consciousness and spirit of cooperation quite contrary to the
"international boundary-dotted line syndrome" that so fixated the United States and Canada
during the Gulf of Maine dispute. Third, Great Lakes fisheries problems evolved differently
than those of the Gulf of Maine. Like the Gulf situation, there was a history of over fishing in
the Great Lakes and escalating concern about its consequences. There were also serious signs
of pollution in the lower lakes (Michigan, Erie and Ontario) during the 1950. and 1960s that
had consequences for the fisheries. But the critical factor, as we now discuss, was the sea
lamprey.
156. Great Lakes Fishery Commission [GLFC], The Sea Lamprey, A GreatLakes Invader,at
http://www.glfc.org/pubs/FACT-3.pdf (last visited April 1, 2001).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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governments and organizations testified in support of a joint United
States-Canada strategy to address the pending fisheries crisis. s '
This mutual focus on the sea lamprey problem enabled the United
States and Canada to forge institutional arrangements that worked to
mitigate the growing Great Lakes fisheries crisis. In 1955, the two countries,
participating in a tradition of cooperative management of boundary waters
and related resources initiated in the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, ratified
the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (the Convention or CGLF) and
established its implementing institution, the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission (the Commission or the GLFC). The Convention served as the
basis for creating an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. The
institutional design for the Commission incorporated a structure and
decision-making process that fostered development of a problem solving,
research based approach to managing the "fishery component" of the Great
Lakes Basin ecosystem. Under the leadership of the GLFC and the
ecosystem centered approach to fisheries management it eventually
developed, the Great Lakes experienced significant recovery of certain fish
species, such as Lake Trout and Whitefish in the Upper Lakes and Great
Northern Pike in the lower lakes." Moreover, there was overall
improvement in how joint and cooperative management of fisheries
resources functioned.
The Great Lakes approach, with its focus on a shared natural
resource problem, resulted from a lesson learned prior to negotiation of the
Convention: a joint strategy was needed that did not focus on regulatory
issues of allocation and control. That lesson was learned in 1946 when the
United States failed to secure ratification for a negotiated convention that
incorporated a regulatory approach." The politics of who could take how
many of which species obscured the need to both understand and respond
to the resource problem that confronted both the United States and Canada.

159. Those expressing concern included governors or their representatives from Ohio,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois; representatives of Federal Agencies with
fisheries interests in the Great Lakes (e.g., Interior, State); state level agencies; sport and
commercial fisheries interests such as the commercial Michigan Fish Producers Association;
environmental groups (e.g., Michigan United Conservation Clubs, National Wildlife
Federation, Federation of Freshwater Fisheries, the Wildlife Society); and research scientists.
See GreatLakes FisheriesConvention:Hearingbefore a Subcommittee ofthe Senate ForeignRelations
Committee, 84th Cong. (1955) [hereinafter GreatLakes Hearings).
160. GreatLakesFisheryCommission, Reseamr,athttp://www.glfc.org/researchhtn (last
visited April 1, 2001).
161. It is beyond the bounds of this study, but the 1946 failure invites comparison of its

underlying causes with those of another strongly regulatory approach to fisheries
management the failed EastCoast Fisheries Agreement. Indeed, it is curious that although the

failed 1946 convention led decision makers to find an alternative approach for the Great Lakes,
it had no effect whatever on considerations about the viability of the ECFA.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

Senator Hubert Humphrey (MN) drew the important distinction when he
introduced the ratification hearings for the 1955 Convention on Great Lakes
Fisheries before a Senate subcommittee: "That convention in 1946 provided
for regulating the fishing operations in the Great Lakes, while the present
convention limits the Commission to research, to recommendations, and to
lamprey-control operations. There is also a necessity for implementing
legislation once this treaty is ratified.... .6
Concern that possible regulatory debates over competitive access
to the fishery would scuttle the GLFC's joint management efforts loomed
large enough to warrant incorporation of an explicit statement about the
Commission's procedural jurisdiction within the text of the Convention:
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as preventing
any of the States of the United States of America bordering on
the Great Lakes, or subject to their constitutional
arrangements, Canada or the Province of Ontario from
making or enforcing laws or regulations within their
respective jurisdictions relative to the fisheries of the Great
Lakes so far as such laws or regulations do
63 not preclude the
carrying out of the Commission's duties.
This new policy proposal avoided embroiling the Commission in politics
that would likely arise from efforts to assign it the institutional
responsibility for determining and allocating who could take how many of
which commercial fish species. Instead, regulatory policies related to
dividing the "take" remained with the domestic fishery management
agencies while the Commission had responsibility for determining totaltake
available within the entire Great Lakes system in view of its priority policy
of establishing and maintaining sustainable fisheries.1'
The cooperative, consensus based approach envisioned by the
parties in the CGLF was built into its institutional structure. The
Commission had as many as six members with not more than three from
each country1" and each party had one vote, which prevented policies from

162. See GreatLakes Hearings,supra note 159, at 8.
163. Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10,1954, U.S.-Can, art. X, 6 U.S.T. 2836

[hereinafter CGLFJ.
164. See Great Lakes Fishery Commission, JointStrategic PlanforManagementof Great Lakes
Fisheries Revision, (June 10,1997) [hereinafter Joint Strategic Plan!, at http://www.glkorg/
fishmgmt/slfmp97.htm. See also Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Strategic Vision Statement

of Great Lakes Fishery Commission for the Decade of the I990s, at http-//www.glfc.org/pubs/
visum.htm (last visited April 2, 2001) [hereinafter StrategicVision).
165. The CGLF specifies no more than six commissioners. CGLF, supranote 163, at art. IL
§ 1. The GLFC reports four from each country andone U.S. alternate. See Great Lakes Fishery
Commission, GLFC Members, Staff, Boards, and Operations, at http.//www.glfc.org/staff/
boards.htm (visited April 2,2001) [hereinafter Membersl.
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moving forward unless both sides agreed.'" Its various advisorybodies and
lake management committees were also bilateral. The bilateral committees
enabled collaborative rhetorical practices that aimed at studying the Great
Lakes fishery problem and formulating appropriate solutions.
B. The Ecosystem Approach: Framing Integrative Communication
In the Great Lakes context, an ecosystem approach to fisheries
conservation and management extended beyond the U.S. conservation
arguments put forward in the Gulf of Maine case. There, the United States
defined the areal boundaries of ecological regimes for purposes of assigning
exclusive control and allocating exclusive harvesting. In contrast, the Great
Lakes institutional arrangements generated deliberations that identified and
interrelated components of the "fish system" and determined how human
activities influenced that system's functioning. The institutional basis for
those deliberations is summarized below.
The preamble to the CGLF emphasizes that all major components
of the natural resource problem should be addressed with an integrative,
more systemic approach. The parties not only outlined central components
of the natural resource problem confronting them, but they also recognized
that the decline of the fisheries was tied to multiple interrelated components
that included (1) damage caused by the sea lamprey; (2) the
interrelationships among different aspects of the fisheries conservation
problem; and (3) the desirability of furthering research on the Great Lakes
fisheries." Moreover, the preamble stipulates that "joint and coordinated
efforts" by the two nations are "essential in order to determine the need for
and the type of measures that will make possible the maximum sustained
productivity in Great Lakes Fisheries of common concern."'6 The current
practice of having representatives of the GLFC sit as ex-officio members on
the Science Advisory Board under the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement also illustrates an institutional arrangement that fosters
integrative discussions. This facilitates coordination and information
exchange with the International Joint Commission's work under the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty to restore the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem's
health.'"

166. CGLF,supra note 163, at art IL § 2.
167. CGLF, supra note 163, at pmbl.

168. Id.
169. See JointStrategic Plan,supranote 164, at apps. E & F. This information is also part of
the personal experience of the co-author, Mimi Larsert-Becker, who served as a member and
then chair of the Science Advisory Board's (hereinafter SAB) Expert Committee on Social
Aspects of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between 1977 and 1982. Between 19811987, Becker was also a member of the Steering Committee and workshop coordinator of the
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The CGLFestablished a geographical foundation appropriate to the
ecosystem-centered approach that evolved from the Commission's joint
problem solving efforts. As the Convention specified, the Commission's
area of concern extended wherever "necessary to investigate any stock of
fish of common concern, the taking or habitat of which is confined
predominantly to the Convention Area, and to eradicate or minimize the
populations of sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) in the Convention
Area."" ° Thus the Commission's areal domain extended beyond the
boundary waters (the lakes and the "dotted line down the middle" which
delimits national boundaries) to include their tributaries and put in place
the option to determine the spatial areas included under the Treaty's
jurisdiction so that all relevant ecosystem parameters associated with
fisheries management problems could be incorporated. 1 The fact that the
spatial area covered by the GLFC incorporated domestic territory on both
sides of the boundary was acceptable given the nature of the problem. This
removed potential political barriers to solving fisheries related problems.
In this case, the parties' did not use geography or other sciences as
resources for strategic, persuasive arguments on behalf of preconceived
aims and claims. Instead, the effort was to integrate geography with the
findings of other sciences to better understand how relationships among all
of the ecosystem's major components defined the natural resource problem
and established the context for framing possible remedies."

Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem Management Strategy Workshop, which addressed the
challenges posed by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1987. That workshop was
cosponsored by the International Joint Commission's Science Advisory Board, the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission, the Association of Great Lakes Research, and Great Lakes Tomorrow.
The Workshop developed recommendations and drafted a report for implementing an
ecosystem approachlor managing Great Lakes water quality. See W.J. Christie et aL, Managing
the Great Lakes Basin as a Home, 12 J.GREAT LAKESRU 2, (1985).
170. CGLF, supranote 163, at art. L
171. See id; Great Lakes Fishery Commission, GLFC: History, Structure, and Mandate, at
http://www.glfc.org/pubs/facts.hm (last visited April 3,2001); Agreement on Great Lakes
Water Quality, Nov. 22,1978, U.S.-Ca., 30 U.S.T. 1383 [hereinafter, GLWQA], lastamended by

Protocol, Nov. 18, 1987, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,551. See also generally Joint Strategic Plan,
supranote 164.

172. See generallyCGLF, supranote 163; Joint StrategicPlan, supranote 164; GLWQA, supra
note 171; Reports of the International Joint Commission to the Governments, at
http://www.icorg/icweb-e.html lastvisited May 6, 2001)(especially the5th through the 9th
Biennial Reports). See generally Mimi Larsen Becker, Implementing a Binational Ecosystem
Management Strategy in the Great Lakes Basin: Will the Remedial Action Policy Process Succeed in
RestoringtheAreas ofConcern?(1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file
with University of Michigan Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, M); Christi et. al., supra note
169, at 3.
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C. The Rhetoric of Ecosystem Sustainability and the GLFC's Standards
of Judgment
An ecosystem approach to natural resource problems would
provide context specific, ecologically sound strategies in response to natural
resource problems that affect the fisheries. The GLFC was designed to
enable the parties to focus on the entire system as a basis for sustaining the
fisheries. In contrast with the adjudicatory approach, the parties'
deliberations are continuously evaluated against findings relevant to the
state of the entire ecosystem.7 Thus, it becomes possible for parties to
"find" for the ecosystem over and against parochial economic or political
interests that might otherwise seep into deliberations.' Accordingly, they
can work to formulate responses to the problem of sustainable fisheries that
could lead to recovery and long-term maintenance of both the ecosystem
and of those who depend upon it for food and jobs.
In the Gulf of Maine, the problem is not just deciding "who gets
how many fish." Instead, deliberation and judgment should center on
recovery of the fisheries within the entire context of sustaining the
functional capacity of their supporting ecological system so as to maintain
healthy fisheries over time. The Great Lakes Fisheries approach illustrates
how the goal of "ecosystem sustainability" can constrain how disputing
parties and neutral third parties conduct their rhetorical practices. In the
Great Lakes, the common goal is to sustain the functional integrity of
ecosystems while producing desired resources and environmental services;
any practices contrary to that goal are viewed as illegitimate."r Thus, it is
necessary to structure institutional arrangements and evolve management
policies and practices which act to enable rather than constrain the capacity
of the system to support viable, healthy populations and fish communities
that foster the necessary conditions for a continued supply of fish. How
science is used to guide deliberation and evaluation becomes critical from
the vantage of ecosystem sustainability.

173. See CGLF, supranote 163, at arts. I,IV, V, VI; Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Great
Lakes Fishery Research: Making Science-Based Management Possible, at http://www.glfc.org/
pubs/FACT.2.pdf (last visited April 3, 2001) [hereinafter Science-Based Management]; Joint
Strategic Plan,supra note 164; Strategic Vision, supranote 164.
174. The political and economic issues that arise are usually addressed by the Joint Lake
ManagementCommittees intheir development of Joint Strategic Fisheries Management Plans.
175. See Becker, supra note 172; GLWQA, supranote 171. This condusionis also based upon
a broad review of Great Lakes Fishery Commission and International Joint Commission
scientific reports and other literature, as well as the personal observations of co-author Becker.
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D. Science and the Demands of Sustainable Fisheries
In the Gulf case, both parties used science as a strategic, persuasive
means for supporting preconceived, partisan, parochial aims and claims.
The GLFC offers an alternative in which bilateral teams of experts from
relevant scientific fields are charged with bringing forward the best
available science and applying it to gain comprehensive understandings of
the fisheries sustainability problem and its possible remedies. Those
understandings guide formulation of aims and claims advanced during
deliberations. For example, prior study of this question is required for
meaningful deliberations about fisheries sustainability: Is it overfishing of
single species that is the source of the problem, or do we need to know
more about impacts of single species management on fish communities in
an ecosystem context? To address that question, scientists must first verify
the sources of stress on the fishery and then determine what efforts are
needed to ensure its recovery. Consensus on these aspects of the problem
is needed well before meaningful deliberations about resource allocation
issues can take place. The point is that scientific information must constrain
policy deliberation and evaluation rather than simply be put into rhetorical
service on behalf of parochial interests.
The Convention specified duties for the Commission that stressed
the importance of providing a scientific basis for understanding natural
resource problems and for designing strategies to restore and maintain the
fisheries. 76 For example, the Commission was assigned the duty to
undertake research that "determined the need for measures to make
possible the maximum sustained productivity of any stock of fish in the
Convention Area, which, in the opinion of the Commission, is of common
concern to the fisheries [of the parties]... and to determine what measures
are best adapted for such purpose."'" The Commission had either to
"coordinate research made pursuant to such programs.. .or undertake the
research itself if necessary."'" Also, the Commission was to develop and
implement a comprehensive sea lamprey eradication or minimization
program.'" Finally, the Commission is to publish scientific and other
information obtained by the GLFC.'8

176. CGLF, supra note 163, at arts. IV,V, VI.
177. Id. at art. IV(a).
178. id. at art. IV(b).
179. Id. at article WV(d).
180. Id. at art. T. This joint and collaborative approach to fisheries management research
was underscored by (1) the additional authority ceded to the GLFC by the parties to conduct
investigations, take measures or install devices in the Convention Area and tributaries related
to sea lamprey control and hold public hearings in both countries, id. at art. V; (2) authorization
to use official agencies of the parties and their jurisdictions, private or other public
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The Commission's committee structure was designed to further
efforts to secure the best available information concerning the fisheries. It
was under mandate to form advisory committees for each of the Great
Lakes. Each Lake Management Committee, which includes representatives
of fishery management agencies, is expected to determine the amount of
fishing pressure each species could sustain and to recommend maximum
harvests within a Joint Strategic Plan for that particular Great Lake.18
In practice, the GLFC has recognized that an ecosystem approach
to fisheries management must provide a means for incorporating the results
of research in decision making if fisheries problems are to be adequately
identified and addressed.' For example, the Commission's institutional
arrangements have been designed explicitly to facilitate a cooperative
"research driven" approach that culminated in ecosystem-centered
management.' This approach has held strong during the 45 years since its
ratification and has culminated in developing an ecosystem approach for
addressing both fisheries management and water quality issues in the entire
Great Lakes Basin watershed. 184
As of 2000, the Commission's research agenda now includes not
only sea lamprey control-including alternatives to lampricides-but also
research in support of healthy ecosystems."5 Specific research initiatives are
determined with the advice of a number of standing committees and boards
(i.e., Sea Lamprey Integration Committee, Board of Technical Experts,
organizations, international organizations or individuals to carry out its duties, id. at art VI; (3)
authorization to establish working relationships with public or private organizations to carry
out objectives of the CGLF, id.; (4) agreement that each party would make requested
at art. VIU; and (5) agreement to respond to a
information available to the Commission, id.
at art. Vll. For
budget of joint expenses and to fund the activities of each of its sections, id.
purposes of monitoring progress the GLFC is required to submit an annual report, including
making recommendations or advising the parties about matters covered by the Convention.
Id. at art. IX.
181. To date these seem to have been equitably allocated, since parties abide by specified
limits. See Joint Strategic Plan,supra note 164, apps. A, C, E, F, G, H. All relevant jurisdictions
reconfirmed their commitment to stated objectives of the plan as well as to the means for
achieving them when they officially adopted it and became signatories. For an example ofhow
Lake Management Committees are constituted, see Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Council
of Great Lakes Fishery Agencies Terms of Reference, at http://www.glfc.org/lakecom/
cglfa/torcglfa.htm (last visited April 3,2001), and Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Members
of the Council of Lake Committees, at http://www.glfc.org/lakecom/clcmem.htm (last visited
April 3,2001).
182. A major component of any ecosystem approach is the use of sound, science-based
information to make decisions. This requires a focus on research and effective approaches for
determining research priorities, funding them, and then applying the results to the problems
that must be addressed. The GLFC has taken a very disciplined approach to this assigned task.
183. See Joint Strategic Plan,supra note 164.
184. See CGLF, supranote 163; Joint StrategicPlan, supranote 164.
185. Science-Based Management, supra note 173.
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Habitat Advisory Board, the individual Lake Committees, and the Great
Lakes Fish Health Committee).' m Members of those committees are
generally fisheries experts from academic and research institutions,
government agencies, and tribal resource management agencies." 7 One
critical result from years of research is that fisheries management in the
Great Lakes now is scientifically based and firmly rooted in the ecosystem
approach. The Commission recently stated that it
provided the two nations with the know how to control sea
lampreys effectively and has reinforced how important sea
lamprey control is to the health and sustainability of the
fisheries. It has demonstrated that fish populations are
interconnected, that they are vulnerable to human-induced
and natural changes, and that restoring native
species-particularly predatory fish-will bring more natural
balance to the ecosystem. This research has also underscored
that certain exotic species, over-exploitation, and habitat
destruction act to destabilize the fishery.
Above all, the commission's research has confirmed that
fisheries managers must always cooperate to protect the
fishery for 18today's use and to sustain it for future
generations. '
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Gulf of Maine case demonstrates that the Chamber institution
of the ICJ enables rhetorical practices and strategies that are designed to
resolve political disputes while diverting attention from underlying natural
resource problems that often spur them. Four strategies serve as indicators
that the institution is incapable of addressing the problem of a sustainable
fishery: first, the two parties' decision to frame the problem primarily as
political; second, the two parties' use of a linear process of argumentation
in which the range of relevant arguments and issues is reduced to those
with strategic, persuasive potential for redeeming preestablished aims and
claims; third, the Chamber's use of adjudicatory standards to render a
decision that balances competing equity claims, political pressures toward
compromise, and relevant international law; and fourth, the two parties'
use of science as a strategic, persuasive means for securing their respective
186. See Members, supranote 165.
187. See Joint Strategic Plan, supra note 164, at app. I.A.1. The signers include the
Chippewa/Ottawa Treaty Fishing Management Authority and the Great Lakes Indian Fish and
Wildlife Commission.
188. Science-Based Management,supra note 173.
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claims from a tribunal ill-equipped to evaluate claims about science. These
four strategies do meet the persuasive demands of effective adversarial
pleading and thoughtful legal adjudication, but they also signal the
workings of an institution incapable of addressing problems of sustainable
fisheries. Accordingly, an alternative institution capable of addressing those
problems should enable rhetorical practices contrary to these four.
We argued that the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries and the
Great Lakes Fishery Commission established institutional arrangements
that can serve as an instructional model for the Gulf of Maine today. Those
joint institutional arrangements-dedicated to a collaborative
approach-are designed to enable rhetorical practices that, collectively, can
work to address the problem of sustainable fisheries. Those rhetorical
practices are directly contrary to the four exhibited in the Gulf of Maine
case: first, the decision to focus on the perceived common threat to the
fisheries as the problem central to deliberations; second, electing an
ecosystem approach so that the parties can identify and interrelate
components that define the entire fish system; third, basing standards for
evaluating competing aims and claims based on the functional capacity of
the ecosystem to support desired uses; and finally, using the best available
science and applying the highest standards of scientific judgment to test the
legitimacy of arguments about the natural resource problem and its possible
remedies.
The current state of the Gulf of Maine fisheries should tell us that
the parties' past approaches for dealing with the decline in the Gulf's
fisheries have failed. We have argued that an alternative problem-focused
consensus-based approach modeled after the one used under the CGLF and
the GLFC could serve to redirect efforts in more productive directions. The
success of that model depends on development of a shared scientific
knowledge base that can inform both decision makers and stakeholders
about the necessity and feasibility of this alternative path. Fundamentally,
however, the reality that confronts us today is that developing the political
will to explore such an alternative is contingent upon changing from
adversarial to collaborative rhetorical strategies-strategies that will enable
the United States and Canada to make a transition from an approach
devoted to dividing spoils from declining fisheries to one targeted at
restoring and sustaining conditions essential to support their health. The
challenge that confronts us is the need to address the question of how to
facilitate that transition. The gloomy prospects for the Gulf's fisheries-like
the threat of the lamprey eel in the Great Lakes-is a calamity in the making
that offers us perhaps a last opportunity to overcome tactics of mutual
blaming and initiate efforts to craft joint institutions that, enable their
restoration and maintenance for future generations.

